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Abstract 
Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the 
proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience 
explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the 
preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by 
embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that 
these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that 
capture different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory 
depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests 
occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic 
questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to 
one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent 
explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to 
partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. 
  
Cognitive science is a big tent, housing a variety of scientific disciplines relevant to the study of 
cognition. As tends to happen in big tents, there are disputes about who has priority and who 
may not belong at all. In particular, there is regular debate about the explanatory value of the 
various scientific disciplines comprising the cognitive sciences. At root, the questions are: which 
cognitive science approaches explain cognitive phenomena, and how do these explanations 
relate to one another? 
This debate is often put in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. There is 
an intuitive sense in which, say, neuroscience targets entities located at a lower level than does 
ecological psychology. Neuroscience investigates phenomena occurring within the nervous 
system, whereas ecological psychology investigates how whole organisms interact with their 
social and environmental surroundings. The former thus seems to focus on entities that are 
proper parts of—and thus at a lower level than—the systems investigated by the latter. The 
debate about levels of explanation in cognitive science regards which level or levels explain 
cognitive phenomena, and thus which disciplines in cognitive science generate explanations. 
Explanatory reductionists assert the explanatory priority of the neurological components of 
cognitive systems. Others advocate explanatory integration, the view that successful cognitive 
science explanations must draw from multiple fields to address multiple levels. Finally, 
explanatory pluralists hold that different cognitive phenomena are best explained at different 
levels, and so by different fields. 
         In this paper, we challenge this framing of the debate about explanation in the cognitive 
sciences. Interpreting this as a question of levels of explanation is, we argue, misleading in a 
way that has confused the debate. In Section 1, we characterize the debate over levels of 
explanation. In Section 2, we argue that formulating questions about cognitive science 
explanations in terms of levels misconstrues the relationship among candidate cognitive science 
explanations. In Section 3, we motivate a different form of explanatory pluralism that we call 
pluralism of explanatory styles, according to which there are a variety of cross-cutting styles of 
cognitive science explanation, capturing different patterns and responding to different research 
interests. Finally, in Section 4, we outline the implications of this view for explanatory practices 
in the cognitive sciences.          
  
1. The Debate About Levels of Explanation 
Across the sciences and philosophy of science, the terminology of “levels” has often been used 
to distinguish among scientific approaches---those that focus on the relatively large versus the 
miniscule, those that emphasize components versus integrated wholes, those that dig into the 
details versus abstract away from the details. These invocations of levels have led to the 
question of the proper level or levels for scientific explanations, and this question is especially 
apt in cognitive science, an interdisciplinary endeavor that quite obviously includes study of 
multiple levels. 
The concept of levels has been invoked in a number of different ways in science and 
philosophy of science, and these uses can seem similar, but differ in their details (Craver, 2007; 
Potochnik, 2017). In cognitive science, Marr’s (1982) idea that the brain implements processes 
described at higher “algorithmic” and “computational” levels has been tremendously influential; 
this notion of levels regards specificity or generality of description. A mechanistic conception of 
levels is similarly influential in cognitive science; this is the idea that levels are ordered 
according to the components and subcomponents of mechanisms. This is akin to a 
compositional conception of levels in terms of parts and wholes, though even these closely 
related levels concepts differ in their details (Eronon, 2013). 
Commonly described levels in cognitive science include molecular, neurological, 
representational/computational, and social/cultural. These seem to blend together specificity of 
description (e.g. algorithmic modeling) with size ordering (e.g. molecular versus neurological 
versus entire organism-environment relationships). The debate about levels of explanation plays 
out in this context. The options seem to include (1) privileging one level of explanation, as 
exemplified by reductionism; (2) requiring multiple levels for explanation, as with explanatory 
integration; and (3) admitting multiple different levels as separately explanatory, as with 
explanatory pluralism. Each of these positions has been advocated in cognitive science. 
According to explanatory reductionism, in order to explain phenomena, scientists should 
look to the component parts of systems, and then to ever-smaller subcomponents. In cognitive 
science, this typically means anticipating neurological or even molecular explanations for all 
cognitive phenomena. For example, Kandel et al. (2013) claim that “all behavior is an 
expression of neural activity” (xlii) and that this is the source of “the biological principles that 
underlie human behavior” (18). This suggests that all cognitive science explanations are 
ultimately grounded in information about neural activity. If neural activity is truly the basis for 
“the biological principles that underlie human behavior,” then it seems cognitive psychology, 
ecological psychology, and all the rest offer nothing explanatory that neuroscience is not better 
suited to provide. 
There are disagreements about precisely how the neural basis of cognition is best 
investigated and understood---or how far the reduction should go. Functional neuroimaging 
focuses on the activity of neuron populations and brain areas, which is relatively coarse-grained 
compared to approaches that focus on the molecular and cellular basis of cognition. John Bickle 
endorses a radical version of this view he calls ‘ruthless reductionism’ (Bickle, this issue; Bickle, 
2003.) In his view, not only must we turn to neural activity, we must go “‘further down’ to cellular, 
synaptic, and ultimately molecular biological mechanisms” (Bickle 2003, p. 4). Bickle describes 
cognitive psychology and even cognitive neuroscience as “higher levels” that are of merely 
heuristic value: they are useful only to the extent that they help us “in the search for lower level 
neuronal mechanisms” (p. 130). In a vivid illustration of the reductionist ideal, Bickle suggests 
that poverty can only explain criminal behavior if poverty affects neuronal ion exchange: “if, e.g., 
poverty causally influences behavior, it must be "transducible" down to this level of biochemical 
mechanism” (p. 60). This is a particularly extreme version of the broader reductionist idea that 
neural activity holds the key to all explanation in the cognitive sciences. From the perspective of 
cognitive science’s big tent, any approach that centers neural activity in this way is a version of 
brain-centered reductionism. 
         In contrast to reductionism, mechanists emphasize the need for integration among the 
explanatory insights gleaned from different fields of cognitive science to explain cognitive 
phenomena. Milkowski et al. (2018), for example, argue that cognitive science is in the business 
of “building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved [in cognition],” explanations that 
explanatory value of “lower level” neural or even molecular goings-on, mechanists and others 
who advocate explanatory integration emphasize the need for explanations to draw from 
multiple levels. Paul Thagard says: 
I expect that computational models will increasingly aid our understanding of the 
relations between different levels of mechanisms—for example, helping to relate the 
social to the cognitive, the cognitive to the neural, and the neural to the molecular (2005, 
p. 218-219). 
On this view, no discipline has sole explanatory advantage, but rather each provides insight into 
a distinct level of cognitive systems, so they must be integrated to achieve full understanding. 
An integrative stance about cognitive science explanation is also embraced by some who do not 
share this emphasis on mechanism. Gallagher, et al. (2015), for instance, emphasize the aim of 
“multi-scale explanations involving factors at various scales (neuroscientific, psychological, 
phenomenological, social, and so on) all contributing to an integrated explanation” (p. 156-157). 
The positions of explanatory integration and explanatory reductionism seem to agree 
that successful explanations include neural and even molecular details. Explanatory pluralists 
disagree. Many varieties of pluralism about science have been developed. Pluralists about 
explanation typically construe the variety of explanatory insights from different scientific 
investigations as a permanent, desirable feature of science. This too has been justified by 
appeal to levels; for example, Kitcher (1984) argues that the existence of multiple explanations 
is "not simply... a temporary feature of our science stemming from our cognitive imperfections 
but... the reflection of levels of organization in nature" (p. 371). In cognitive science, explanatory 
pluralism amounts to the view that separate explanations may be developed that cite distinct 
levels of phenomena, e.g. molecular, neural, cognitive, and social, and that these explanations 
are independent from one another. Here’s an example of explicit advocacy for explanatory 
pluralism with regards to levels: 
It is plausible to think that there are as many levels of description available as there are 
levels of organization... We may describe humans in terms of their physical make-up, 
their chemical constitution, their physiological structure, their gross anatomy, their 
cognitive capacities, their social role, and much more. All these give a distinctive 
perspective on human psychology (Richardson 2009, p. 474, emphasis added). 
For the explanatory pluralist, each of these perspectives may be able to independently explain 
some cognitive phenomena without recourse to explanatory resources from other levels. 
Advocates of embodied, ecological, and dynamical approaches in cognitive science 
often endorse explanatory pluralism. This supports the view that these approaches can be 
genuinely explanatory, even though they are not straightforwardly integratable with or reducible 
to explanations at the neural level. For example, Dale et al. advocate the explanatory autonomy 
of dynamical systems theory as follows: 
We use many theories to understand the universe. This basic idea, often called 
explanatory pluralism, derives from the diverse levels of organization in the universe, 
and the equally diverse explanatory goals of human beings—concluding that many and 
multifarious theories are needed (2009, p. 739). 
These authors grant that some circumstances call for explanatory integration. Still, they (and 
other explanatory pluralists) uphold the possibility of independent explanations, and many 
explicitly justify this with reference to different levels of organization.1 Notice that explanatory 
pluralism is the only view we’ve surveyed on which neural information is not necessary for all 
cognitive science explanations. 
This is the lay of the land as we see it for views about levels of cognitive science 
explanation. Explanatory pluralists emphasize the possibility of explaining cognitive phenomena 
                                                        
1 To be clear, Dale et al. (2009) do not frame the motivation for pluralism as deriving solely from level of 
organization but also as due to the diversity of explanatory goals scientists have. We agree with them on the latter, 
as will become clear below. 
in different ways at different levels. Integrationists emphasize the need for explanations to draw 
from multiple levels, including neural and even molecular levels, to fully explain. Reductionists 
hold that neural or even molecular investigations are (or, with research advances, will be) 
uniquely poised to explain all cognitive phenomena. All three positions tend to share the 
presumption that the different phenomena involved in cognition, and the different investigations 
that target them, hold a hierarchical or leveled relationship to one another. In what follows, we 
challenge this presumption. 
  
2. Explanations Don’t Come in Levels 
Above we noted that there are different concepts of levels, related (at least) to degree of 
abstraction, material composition, and mechanistic composition, and these can all be bound up 
with the question of level of explanation. Another levels concept at play in debates about 
explanation relates to the realization, or implementation of one property by others; this is 
somewhat related both to degree of abstraction and mechanistic composition, but it does not 
straightforwardly correspond to either. These different concepts that can be used to articulate 
levels are sometimes aligned, but often not (Potochnik, 2017). But, regardless of which concept 
or concepts are used to articulate levels, in our view, the entities and properties that feature in 
different “levels” of explanation in cognitive science fail to relate to one another in any of the 
anticipated ways. It’s not simply that cognitive science explanations sometimes do not perfectly 
fit leveling schemes; we believe “levels” quite often misdescribes the relationship among 
different approaches to cognitive science explanation. Simply put, different approaches to 
cognitive science explanations are not arranged into levels. 
Let’s return to the example of criminal behavior introduced above in the context of 
Bickle’s ruthless reductionism. Neuroscientists who investigate criminal behavior study 
happenings in the brain that may relate to such behavior. But the biochemical mechanisms that 
Bickle emphasizes are hard to come by, as very many things happen in the brain, and “we have 
no prior knowledge of what the relevant level of brain organization is for any given behavior" 
(Krakauer et al., 2017, p. 480). So, instead, neuroscientists often focus on activity in entire brain 
regions. In forensic neuroimaging, for example, researchers look for neural biomarkers of 
aggressive and impulsive behavior (Bufkin and Luttrell, 2005; Aharoni et al., 2013). Personality 
and cognitive psychologists, in turn, have studied criminal behavior by focusing on, for example, 
cognitive processing patterns associated with antisocial personality disorder (Riser and Kosson, 
2013), personality characteristics such as rejection sensitivity and proneness to rumination 
(Bartolo et al., 2010), and impaired social information-processing skills (Bennet et al., 2005). 
Some psychological research focuses on the situational, social and environmental factors 
associated with crime incidence (see, e.g., Clarke, 1980; Brown and Altman, 1983; Perkins et 
al., 1993; Kuo and Sullivan, 2001; Donovan and Prestemon, 2012). Embodied and ecological 
approaches have in turn focused on the perceptual patterns of offenders (McArthur and Baron, 
1983; Topalli, 2005; Topalli et al., 2015, Renaud et al., 2013) and the dynamics of social 
coordination in groups (Coleman et al., 2007; Tesser and Achee, 1994; Barrett et al., 2012). 
Each of these approaches potentially provides explanatory insight into criminal behavior: 
variously, the role of neural activity, psychological disorders, social abilities, environmental 
factors, and perceptual and social dynamics. Yet it’s readily apparent that the factors focal in 
these different research projects aren’t related to one another as parts and wholes, mechanisms 
and their components, or realization/implementation, the primary candidates for articulating 
levels. Bickle claimed that a social factor like poverty must be “transduced” into biochemical 
mechanisms, but even if relevant biochemical pathways are identified for poverty, these are not 
parts of poverty nor do they implement poverty. Instead, poverty may cause certain biochemical 
happenings. Poverty is also related causally (if at all) to personality and cognitive traits such as 
antisocial personality disorder and rejection sensitivity; these certainly do not relate as parts-
wholes or realization/implementation. Some social and environmental factors might affect 
personality, cognitive features, and embodied perceptual characteristics, and vice versa, but 
again, this connection is causal influence, not a compositional or determining relationship.  
We suspect that this point about the relationship among cognitive science insights into 
criminal behavior also applies to most other investigations in cognitive science. Perhaps 
sometimes, different factors targeted in different investigations are related compositionally, 
mechanistically, or in some other way that supports referring to them as different levels of 
explanation. But, by and large, “levels” seems misleading in this context. To be clear, we grant 
the existence of part-whole and realization/implementation relationships, and this discussion is 
not meant to convince readers that there are no levels of organization. Rather, our point is that 
the entities and properties focal to different cognitive science explanations are not usually 
related to one another in any of the primary ways used to articulate levels. 
Perhaps the strongest intuitions in favor of a level relationship among cognitive science 
approaches relate to the role of neural processes, which are thought to implement cognitive 
functions. Yet personality and cognitive traits, traditionally seen as the level immediately above 
the brain, have not been shown to relate in this way to patterns of neural activity. Our claim is 
not that cognition is somehow spookily accomplished without neurological processes. Rather, 
the idea is that neuroscientists choose to focus on certain neural phenomena based on 
promising neuroscientific questions, cognitive psychologists choose to focus on certain cognitive 
traits based on promising questions about cognition, and so on, and there’s no reason to expect 
that these phenomena focal to various approaches to explanation will be related in any of the 
ways anticipated for levels. This point is even more obvious for situational and social factors. If, 
for example, interpersonal dynamics help account for social coordination and cohesion (Marsh 
et al., 2009), then the neural characteristics of individuals may be enabling conditions for social 
coordination and cohesion, but they cannot by themselves implement interpersonal dynamics.2 
                                                        
2 See Potochnik (2010) for a more extended argument for this point about levels of explanation in general. 
The entities and properties focal to different cognitive science explanations, including the 
molecular, neurological, representational/computational, and social/cultural factors often 
invoked in discussions of levels of explanation, are thus not generally related by part-whole 
composition, mechanistic composition, or realization/implementation. Rather, these are usually 
best viewed as causally related to one another. Sometimes one investigation may focus on 
some part of an entity or mechanism focal in another investigation, such as (a) investigation of 
how the MAOA enzyme influences dopamine levels and (b) investigation of dopamine levels 
across the brain. But this is uncommon, and when it does occur, the investigation of the part 
tends to regard only one limited component of a broader phenomenon and situates it in the 
context of different research interests (such as, in this case, the effects of the MAOA gene.) 
Instead of appealing to part-whole, mechanism-component, or 
realization/implementation relationships, one may try to distinguish levels of explanation based 
on different levels of analysis, such as implementation, algorithmic, and computational levels, 
with neural events and structure belonging to the implementation level. But this is no more 
promising. The presumed levels of explanation in cognitive science do not by and large 
correspond to this articulation of levels of analysis. For example, social coordination and 
organism-environment relations are not implemented in the brain, or at least not entirely; the 
environmental and social structure also participate in the implementation. Further, the idea that 
different cognitive science approaches provide different levels of analysis presumes that these 
approaches are ordered in their degree of abstraction or generality, with neural explanations 
more specific than representational/computational explanations, which are in turn more specific 
than social/cultural explanations. This is not the case. Neuroscience offers some quite general 
insights into neural and brain region activity, as well as highly specific treatments of neural 
processes involved in certain cognitive phenomena. The findings of cognitive psychology and 
ecological approaches can similarly be highly specific or quite general, depending on the 
targeted phenomenon. Research into the dynamics of group coordination can be quite general, 
or highly specific, like the finding that children attribute less interest in play to non-handicapped 
children interacting with mildly handicapped playmates (Van Acker and Valenti, 1989). 
Some cognitive scientists emphasize scales rather than levels. We endorse this shift, as 
comparisons in spatial scale or temporal scale do not have some of the problematic implications 
plaguing levels (Potochnik and McGill, 2012). But approaches to cognitive science explanation 
are not in general ordered by spatial or temporal scale any more than they are by level of 
organization. There is a spatial scaling from brain to organism to group, but there is not a similar 
temporal scaling. For example, neural reuse (Anderson, 2014, 2016) is a principle of functional 
organization in the brain that occurs phylogenetically and ontogenetically; explanations of 
behavior in terms of neural reuse thus cite entities at a small spatial scale but at a very broad 
range of timescales. And then, the spatial scaling of brain-organism-group doesn’t continue 
across other phenomena investigated in the cognitive sciences. Ecological psychologists often 
describe their research as focusing on the “organism-environment level [of analysis]” and the 
“ecological scale” (e.g. Wagman and Miller, 2003). But organism-environment relations occur 
across a number of different spatial scales, some of which are much smaller than the human 
brain. 
We have suggested that the entities and properties focal to different approaches to 
cognitive science explanations, including molecular, neurological, 
representational/computational, and social/cultural, are not related in the characteristic ways 
anticipated for levels relationships—by part-whole, realization/implementation, or degree of 
abstraction. Rather, they most often relate causally, as different influences on complex cognitive 
phenomena. Nor is there a characteristic spatial or temporal scale relationship for the different 
approaches to cognitive science explanations. Thus, levels (or scales) of explanation is simply 
not the right way to pose the question about the explanatory value of different approaches in the 
cognitive sciences, no matter what your view is regarding that value. Thinking of these 
approaches to explanation as levels suggests relationships among them that by and large fail to 
obtain.  
  
3. Explaining with Patterns 
In Section 2, we argued that the standard positions on the question of levels of explanation in 
cognitive science share a mistaken presupposition about how the candidate explanations relate 
to one another. By and large, properties and entities featured in these explanations are not 
related to one another in any of the ways that have been used to articulate levels. Rather, they 
tend to be causally related. Different approaches to explanation feature different causal 
influences on a target phenomenon, at least some of which may causally influence one another. 
We thus urge a reframing of the questions of which approaches explain cognitive phenomena 
and how these explanations relate to one another. 
         But the basic questions still remain: which approaches explain cognitive phenomena, 
and how do these explanations relate to one another? Given what we have said about different 
approaches featuring different causal influences, one may think we should urge explanatory 
integration; we might need all of these different approaches working together to fully explain 
cognitive phenomena. But, while it is certainly true that evidence-sharing and other forms of 
coordination are valuable when grappling with such complex phenomena, we think the lesson to 
draw for explanation is not integration but pluralism. 
         One of the sources of differences among cognitive science research projects is in their 
aim: what phenomena they address, what methods they bring to bear, and toward what specific 
goal. This hearkens back to Dale et al.’s (2009) mention of the “diverse explanatory goals of 
human beings,” as quoted above. Differences in aim occasion focus on different features of 
cognitive phenomena. Different research projects in cognitive science thus give insight into 
different cognitive phenomena, and even into different features of the same cognitive 
phenomena. Pursuing integrated explanations that incorporate other features beyond what is 
focal is time- and resource-intensive, and this is unnecessary to generate satisfactory 
explanations of many cognitive phenomena. 
So, we agree with those who advocate explanatory pluralism in the cognitive sciences. 
But our version of pluralism does not emphasize different, independent “levels” of explanation. 
Rather, on the view we favor—pluralism of explanatory style—different, independent 
explanations in cognitive science provide cross-cutting accounts, sometimes even of the same 
phenomena, that capture different causal patterns. The idea that causes are central to scientific 
explanation is widely held. Some philosophers have also suggested that laws or other broad 
regularities are explanatory (Hempel, 1948; Friedman, 1974; Strevens, 2008), and some 
cognitive science research has backed this up (Lombrozo, 2010). The idea that causal patterns 
are explanatory is simply the idea that information about (1) causal dependence and (2) the 
scope of that dependence is explanatory. This is precisely the information needed to predict and 
intervene on our world: information about what factors influence a phenomenon, and in what 
circumstances. For a general argument that causal patterns are central to scientific explanation, 
see Potochnik (2017). 
         The pluralism of explanatory styles we propose is related to the notion of “scientific 
styles,” or the material, technical, conceptual, linguistic and social practices that vary across 
research projects (Hacking, 1992, 1994; Feyerabend, 1996). Scientific styles are thought to 
shape not only how knowledge is pursued but also what counts as knowledge and what that 
knowledge is of. We have something similar in mind here, but two differences are worth noting. 
First, some discussions of scientific styles emphasize that different fields adopt different styles 
(e.g., Bueno 2012). Here we emphasize  the diversity of styles even within the field of cognitive 
science. Second, our pluralism is specifically about styles of explanation rather than styles of 
research or reasoning in general. In our view,  there are a variety of explanatory styles, each of 
which captures certain causal patterns in cognitive phenomena.  
Let’s return again to the example of criminal behavior. Forensic neuroimaging looks for 
neural biomarkers of aggression and impulsivity—aiming to find patterns in how certain neural 
features relate to propensity toward criminal behavior. Personality psychology in turn may target 
patterns in the role of antisocial personality disorder. Each of these investigations 
operationalizes the phenomenon of criminal behavior in ways convenient for its own purposes, 
investigates the role of factors of interest given their broader research aims, and connects these 
factors to different ranges of related phenomena. After all, neither research into neural patterns 
related to aggression and impulsivity nor research into antisocial personality disorder is confined 
to a focus on criminal behavior. (See Longino, 2013, for an extended case study of how these 
and other features vary among investigations of human aggression.) Thus, in these examples 
and others across cognitive science, a specific explanatory style is adopted in light of the variety 
of causal pattern deemed to be of interest.  This results in a pluralism of multiple, independent 
explanations, even of a single phenomenon targeted in more than one style of investigation. 
There are three important differences between our proposed pluralism of explanatory 
style and a pluralism about explanatory “level.” First, as suggested just above, the various 
explanations of a given phenomenon are recognized to be cross-cutting; they are not 
anticipated to bear a neat relationship to one another, such as implementation/computation or 
components and subcomponents. Second, because of this, it is more readily apparent that each 
style of explanation neglects some important causal factors, factors that are relevant to bringing 
about the phenomenon of interest but not relevant to the specific causal pattern that is focal. On 
this view, which style of explanation is warranted depends on the specifics of the research 
program, including researchers’ interests, methods, and other idiosyncrasies that influence their 
pursuit of explanation. Third, pluralism of explanatory styles and its emphasis on causal patterns 
makes clear the costs of explanatory integration. Additional causal information is not merely 
unimportant; on this view, it is contraindicated. It’s not just that integrated explanations are time- 
and resource-expensive, as we noted above. Integrated explanations also are more limited than 
explanations targeted at a causal pattern of interest, since the additional causal information 
occludes the causal pattern of immediate interest with details that may be causally important but 
are incidental to the immediate research aims (Potochnik 2017). These differences are 
summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
In summary, in our view, there is a variety of cross-cutting styles of cognitive science 
explanations, capturing different causal patterns and responding to different research interests. 
Neuroscience rightly focuses on experimentally detecting patterns in neural activation and brain 
area-behavior relationships, whereas these can be wholly tangential to cognitive psychology’s 
focus on computationally modelling behavior in terms of information processing. Embodied and 
ecological approaches, in turn, frame perception-action cycles as features of entire animal-
environment systems, and accordingly (rightly) focus on interaction dynamical patterns to the 
exclusion of neural and (sub)personal dynamical patterns.  Which explanatory style is warranted 
depends on the cognitive phenomenon under investigation, but this also depends on the 
interests and cognitive needs of those seeking the explanation, as those help determine which 
causal pattern is enlightening. 
  
4. Different Explanatory Styles in the Cognitive Sciences 
Reframing the question of cognitive science explanation as a debate not about discrete levels 
but about cross-cutting patterns is not empty philosophical debate about words. Rather, this 
reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions identified at the outset of this 
paper of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one 
another. On our view of pluralism of explanatory styles, different approaches offer independent 
explanations, even of the same phenomena, in terms of the distinct causal patterns they focus 
on. The value of these explanations partly derives from their identification of broad patterns in 
causal influence; this distinguishes our emphasis on causal patterns from an emphasis on mere 
causal information or causal mechanism. This places the researchers who seek explanation 
centerstage: which kinds of potential causes are of immediate interest to them is crucial to 
determining which kind of explanatory style is called for. 
         This may make it seem like we're downplaying the differences between cognitive 
science explanations, as if which is warranted is merely a matter of taste. That there is a 
diversity of interests and of cognitive needs at play in cognitive science may seem insufficient to 
motivate pluralism, especially when compared to pluralism motivated by the belief in different 
levels. But we are not suggesting that differences among cognitive science approaches are 
simply a matter of preference. Rather, a successful explanatory style is identified when the right 
research question is posed and a pattern is uncovered in the causal action of some factor of 
interest. This is, we submit, what it takes to explain. An individual scientist's preference is not 
sufficient to justify the choice of explanatory style for a given research project. Indeed, it doesn't 
even seem right to think in terms of choice. Training within a given scientific field ultimately 
shapes the practitioners' cognitive needs and interests, delimiting in specific ways the range of 
explanatory styles available to anyone working within that field—determining which options are 
"live" and which are "dead," to use James's (1896) terms. 
         On the pluralism of explanatory styles that we urge, and in contrast to explanatory 
integration, it is not desirable for explanations to include as much causal information as possible 
relevant to the phenomenon to be explained. Rather, only information about causes of interest, 
together with the scope of their influence—the focal causal pattern—is explanatory. It is no 
shortcoming for an explanation of a cognitive phenomenon to omit information about causes of 
that phenomenon that are incidental to the focal causal pattern. This accords with research 
practices in the cognitive sciences. Neuroscience explanations regularly omit reference to 
environmental influences, cognitive psychology explanations regularly omit reference to non-
cognitive influences, and embodied and extended explanations regularly omit reference to 
neurological details. Each explanatory style benefits from these kinds of exclusions. 
         There are, though, two ways in which causal pattern explanations can go wrong. There 
are two requirements for successful causal pattern explanations: (1) the causal pattern depicted 
must be responsible for the phenomenon to be explained, and (2) the causal pattern depicted 
must be of interest to the research program occasioning the explanation. Two forms of criticism 
of causal pattern explanations are thus possible. First, an explanation is not successful if the 
causal pattern it depicts fails to obtain. “Just so” stories are not explanations. This sharpens the 
questions that should be asked about any given approach in the cognitive sciences. Consider, 
for example, embodied, ecological, and dynamical approaches, since the status of these are 
relatively contentious. If we are right about a pluralism of explanatory styles, it is not sufficient to 
criticize these approaches for not including neurological details, nor for focusing on different 
kinds of causal influences than other cognitive science approaches. One should instead ask 
whether patterns in fact exist in how ecological factors and embodiment influence cognitive 
phenomena. (In many cases, the answer is yes.) 
The second form of criticism regards not causal facts but research interests. Even when 
patterns exist in the causal influence of some factor, it may be dubious as a research focus, or it 
may be fairly criticized as less important than other causal patterns that aren’t receiving similar 
focus. Amos et al. (2010) find an association between a certain genetic variant and the 
propensity to initiate smoking. But their findings, even if legitimate, are surely on balance 
unimportant to research into smoking. Many other research questions are better positioned to 
help us understand and intervene on this public health concern. 
From the viewpoint of pluralism in explanatory styles, any approach in cognitive science 
can offer explanations if it successfully identifies a causal pattern of interest that accounts for 
the phenomenon under investigation. Different approaches are thus not offering competing 
explanations, but compatible, independent explanations of different phenomena, or even of the 
same phenomena but focused on different causal patterns. None of what we have said 
undermines the importance of interdisciplinary exchange. The cognitive sciences address a 
range of related phenomena; sharing data and methods is undoubtedly valuable. Indeed, 
developing integrated explanations across disciplines can be a worthy project. But, in our view, 
this is just one kind of explanatory aim among many. 
Our account of cross-cutting patterns and the resulting pluralism of explanatory styles 
reframes the debate about cognitive science explanation: the question is not which levels are 
explanatory, but which explanatory style is called for given the potential causal pattern of 
interest. This clarifies the questions that should be asked to ascertain whether any given field 
explains cognitive phenomena, and this changes our expectations for how different cognitive 
science explanations relate to one another. Thus, in our view, levels-thinking shouldn’t influence 
how disciplines within cognitive science view their respective explanatory projects. Those 
projects are not neatly aligned, and none---even explanatory integration---takes priority over the 
others. Extra causal detail obscures the very patterns that are explanatory for a given research 
focus. There’s much to be gained from recognizing the pluralism of explanatory styles across 
the cognitive sciences. 
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Pluralism of explanatory level                     Pluralism of explanatory style 
1.      Explanations anticipated to be ordered by,   Explanations recognized as cross-cutting    
e.g., part-whole, implementation, or scale 
  
2.              Level of explanation determines what        Research interests determine which causes 
kind of information is explanatory               to include and which to exclude 
  
3.              Extra causal information unimportant        Extra causal information detrimental 
to depicting causal pattern 
  
Table 1: The features of our proposed pluralism of explanatory style contrasted with an 
explanatory pluralism developed in terms of levels of explanation. 
  
 
 
